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Transformation of the Russian “Leviathan” over the Centuries 
 
 
 Towards the end of 2014 the popular Russian director Andrei Zvyagintsev’s film 
Leviathan came to American screens. The following year the American Academy of Motion 
Picture Arts and Sciences nominated it for an Oscar. The film was named after the treatise by the 
seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes,1 which used the image of the Biblical 
monster Leviathan to describe the power of the state (“mortal God”), which suppresses human 
rights and his dignity. 
 The Russian “Leviathan” in the form of Muscovite kingdom began to form at the end of 
the fifteenth–beginning of the sixteenth century. It formed from a conglomerate of former 
independent principalities and fiefdoms that had been subordinated in the thirteenth century by 
the Mongol Tatars.  The subsequent formation of a single Muscovite state occurred under the 
powerful pressure of the politically experienced Tatar’s Golden Horde, who borrowed from the 
material and political cultures of the Chinese, Mongols, Persians, as well as the Turks.2 
 Beyond Eastern cultural, political, and historical influences, the Muscovite kingdom 
evolved following an Eastern developmental pattern that predetermined by other factors. 
Geographically, the country was located on the Great Russian Plain and was open on all sides to 
foreign intrusions, which occurred especially often from the Eurasian steppe where over the 
centuries hordes of nomadic peoples replaced each other. Unceasing raids by the Tatar Mongols 
on the Rus’3 bore an especially destructive character since they were accompanied not only by 
looting and the destruction of villages, but also by massive murders of the urban and rural 
population, with the survivors driven it into slavery. If feudal strife in Western Europe was 
periodically interrupted by truces, the struggle of the Rus’ with the “Steppe” was almost 
constant. The outstanding Russian historian N. M. Karamzin, describing the Rus’ of the mid-
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sixteenth century, exclaimed pathetically: “Russia, now really strong, still remained a victim of 
sudden attacks: we wanted the enemy to give us time to prepare a defense, drove him out, but our 
villages became empty, and the state lacked its main jewel: people!”4 
 As a result, Russian society was forced to spend vast resources—not on the development 
of the economy and social or spiritual sphere—but on maintenance of a centralized military 
apparatus for repelling the onslaughts of militant nomads. However, maintenance of permanent, 
large, armed forces was impossible without an increased tax burden on the population. This need 
helped form the Muscovite state tax system, created by the Tatars for squeezing out tribute. After 
the conquest of the Russian principalities, they made a list of the whole local population in 1257-
1259 and imposed a tithe on it, which after deliverance from the Tatar yoke shifted into the 
hands of the Muscovite prince, creating a financial base for his power. In addition, the Horde’s 
former Yamskaya duty5 worked in his favor, and his treasury was enriched by money from 
redemption of Tatars’ captives and other duties.6 The Russian state, by the very logic of its 
development, became the most effective mechanism of compulsory removal from the bulk of the 
population their surplus goods (which were quite limited due to the sparse nature of the northern 
country),7 for reallocation for the most important needs, as defined by the authorities. 
 In the struggle for unification of Russian territories, the Muscovy grand duke tried to 
replace the right of land ownership of the semi feudal princes with his own right. From formal 
supreme owner of the land and possessor of the title “Grand Duke of Vladimir,” he turned into a 
real sovereign.8 The other Russian principalities became ordinary districts of the Muscovy Grand 
Duchy through capture, peaceful association, or purchase. After 1480, when the Muscovy prince 
Ivan III cast off the Tatar yoke, once voluntary feudal lords  switched to a position of servants at 
his throne, and the boyar9 vassalage was transformed into a subordinate relation.10 The German 
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diplomat Sigismund Gerberstein, who visited Muscovy in 1517 and 1526, spoke of Grand Duke 
Vasilii Ivanovich, son of Ivan III and father of Ivan IV Groznyi (the Terrible):  
 “The authority that he applies in relation to his subjects easily surpasses all  
 the monarchs of the world. And he also finished what his father began, and  
 precisely took away from all the princes and other lords all their cities and  
 forts. . . . He oppressed all similarly with severe slavery, so that, if he ordered  
 someone to be at his court, or to go to war, or to send someone on an embassy,  
 that person was forced to carry out all this at his own expense. . . . He uses his  
 power on the clergy the same way as on the laity, disposing freely and at his will  
 the life and property of everyone; of all the councilors whom he has, not one uses  
 this position to dare to differ with him or to reject him in an affair.”11 
  
Characterizing this time of transition of Russian society from a period of “udel’naya Rus’” 
(when Russia was fragmented into many independent principalities) to Muscovy absolutism,12 
the well-known Russian historian N. P. Pavlov-Sil’vanskii wrote:  
 “Free servants of the grand duke of the feudal period are replaced in the  
 Muscovy state by slaves of the sovereign. . . . The feudal order was gradually  
 falling starting with Ivan III by deprecation of the feudal princes under the heavy  
 hand of the Muscovy sovereign. Tsar Ivan Groznyi, having taken in 1565 into his 
 “oprichnina” the remains of the hereditary feudal possessions of the princes,13 
 ultimately weakened them, having taken away support for their political claims.”14 
  
 While agreeing on the whole with such characteristics, it should nevertheless be 
emphasized that there was not “feudal order” in the Rus’ before Ivan IV Groznyi, nor after, but 
rather only elements of a feudal way of life existed, a kind of “quasi-feudalism.”15 Initially the 
Muscovy state was formed not as feudal one, but as a politarian. Politarism (from the Greek 
word πολιτεία—the power of the majority, that is, in a broad sense, the state16) is a social system, 
the basis of which is the supreme property of the state on the fundamental means of production 
and primary bulk of the population.17 In Western and Russian scholarship, politarism is often 
referred to as “Asiatic mode of production” (Karl Marx), “patrimonial state” (Richard Pipes), 
“etatism” (Vadim Radaev and Ovsei Shkaratan), “redistributive economy” (Ol’ga Bessonova),” 
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“state feudalism” (Leonid Milov), and so on.18 Outwardly it is reminiscent of feudalism: in both 
cases supreme private (that is, connected with exploitation) ownership of both the land and the 
laborers working on it exists. In both structures the workers (peasants) though dependent, still to 
a certain extent are owners of their land (or at least the labor inventory and other property) as 
well as their person. However, there are also differences. In feudal societies each individual 
feudal lord was in fact an independent supreme private possessor of a large land property,19and 
to him went the surplus product from it. The last was the basis of his economy, and practically, 
also political independence, as a consequence of which there was a period of feudal 
fragmentation in Western Europe. With politarism, only one supreme owner exists, who 
collectively exploits the whole class of producers—the state (bureaucratic) apparatus. In other 
words, in one case private-personal property (feudalism) dominates, in the other—private-state 
(politarism). Since the earliest and most developed forms of politarism had become widespread 
in countries of the East, Karl Marx designated the local civilizations as “societies with an Asian 
method of production.”20 
 Since the Muscovy Rus’ developed within the framework of an Eastern model of 
civilization, the establishment of a centralized state occurred in a fundamentally different way 
than in Western Europe. In the West, the decline of feudalism and the formation of royal 
absolutism were carried out on a base of flourishing of cities, the development of goods-
monetary relations, and a union of emerging urban bourgeois with royal authority against the 
abuses of local lords, which ultimately led to the creation of a nationwide market and state.21 In 
the Muscovy Rus’ it was not market but military power that united the country in a single 
whole.22 The central princely (and then royal authority) in its struggle with the separatism and 
willfulness of the local princes and boyars was supported by the bureaucratic apparatus, 
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landowner nobles, and agrarian communities (societies). The peasants-commoners, incidentally, 
were well aware of the supreme ownership of their lands by the state in the person of the grand 
duke (tsar).23 In the strong royal authority they saw defense from external enemies, looters, and 
internal oppressors—boyars, governors (representatives of the local administration), and kulak-
miroeds.24 However, supreme authority needed the community for reasons of convenience when 
it came to fiscal taxation and control over the local administration. From the symbiosis of the 
socioeconomic interests of the village-community and royal authority, emerged a society-state of 
the Eastern type, camouflaged in western Christian religion (more precisely its Byzantine 
version) and some external European borrowings. “Russian despotism, like all Eastern 
despotism, rested on the ignorance and conservatism of the Russian peasants, who lived in 
notorious (communist!) rural communities,” wrote the first Russian Marxist G. V. Plekhanov in 
1894. He quite correctly pointed to the indisputable similarity of the socioeconomic development 
of Russia with Egypt, Persia, China, and other countries of the East.25 
 The extinction of the Rurik dynasty at the end of the sixteenth century and the following 
Time of Troubles at the beginning of the seventeenth century, brought to power the new 
Romanov dynasty, which initially had to take into consideration the interests of the boyar-noble 
elite and the “Zemshchina”—local urban and rural communities. However, as the “autocratic-
landed” state evolved, based on the apt expression of academician M. M. Bogoslovskii, it gave 
way in the mid-seventeenth century to an “autocratic-bureaucratic” one,26 when the latter having 
gained strength again takes control of all the basic spheres of the life of society. On a base of 
Russian politarism a totalitarian regime is again enforced and a cult of personality of the tsar is 
formed, which was characteristic for Eastern despotism. Thus, the German diplomat Adam 
Olearius, who visited the Muscovy kingdom in the mid-1630s, reported about the Russians: 
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“Already at an early age they inspire their children to speak of his royal majesty as of God and 
revere him just as highly.”27 Two hundred years later, a French traveler, the Marquis Astolf de 
Custine, wrote about the very same: “Among the Russians supreme power is honored like 
religion, the authority of which always rests with the great, independent of the personal merit of 
the clergy.”28 
 At the same time, it is not possible to say that the Russian “Leviathan” did not change 
over the course of centuries. Changes, at times externally very significant, occurred under the 
influence of military threats, economic expansion of the West, and the subjective views of those 
individuals who led the state. Widely known are the reforms of the first Russian emperor Peter I 
at the beginning of the eighteenth century, when he tried (often by drastic means) to Europeanize 
the Russian elite and the life of Russian cities, when he introduced into the country industrial 
production and modern science.29 However, in the end, all his numerous conversions were 
reduced to the creation of a modern army, necessary for access to the Black and Baltic seas, for 
which Peter began a war first with Turkey in the south and then Sweden in the north. “War 
indicated the order of reform, gave it tempo and methods. The transforming measures of Peter 
followed one after another in that order, in which there were needs imposed by war,” wrote the 
noted Russian historian V. O. Klyuchevskii. He continued: “War was the chief driving lever of 
the transforming activities of Peter, military reform was its initial moment, an arrangement of 
finance—its ultimate goal.”30 
 Striving towards a strict centralization of authority and maximal state regulation in the 
period of the Northern War with Sweden (1700–1721), Peter I relied on his unlimited power, 
enmeshed society in a mass of all possible government regulations, prohibitions, and instructions 
(how to build a house, what kaftan to wear, where and how to obtain an education, and so on) to 
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achieve his goals. A professor at Kiev University, M. F. Vladimirskii-Budanov, stated about this: 
“The state in the eighteenth century is a police state in the strictest sense of the word: it takes on 
itself the cares of many, even the unimportant requirements of life of its subjects, especially in 
the sphere of the economic and daily way of life, and regulates them.”31 
 In spite of the externally very spectacular transformations, the reforms of the first 
emperor did not affect the essence of Russian society. This was noted by historians of the pre-
Soviet period. Thus, N. P. Pavlov-Sil’vanskii emphasized:  
 “The highest intension of reforming power of the state in modern times in the  
 era of Peter I did not change the primary foundations of social and state structure 
 . . . . The class structure of the state came from the period of reformations without 
 significant change, and serfdom, which lay at the base of this structure, only  
 increased after Peter. . . . Peter’s reform did not reshape a new structure, but only  
 gave it a new façade.”32 
  
 This was not at all surprising because of the totality of natural, social, and political 
conditions in which the Russian economy was formed and developed over the extent of 
centuries. The Russian economy required a special mechanism for concentration, distribution, 
and use of the surplus goods being created in society, and such mechanism, which enforced 
accumulation and investment of accumulated means, appeared with Peter I’s state, which 
established new factories and executed control over the quality of the goods being produced, the 
organization of external trade, and so on.33 For example, the true owner of private plants and 
factories in the Petrine period was not capitalist manufacturers, but the government 
Manufacturing College, which was clearly stated in its regulations.34 Private individuals could 
begin their business only with its sanction, and they were obligated to present annually samples 
of their goods and pay 10 percent of their profits. In addition, metal, as a strategic material, had 
to be surrendered to the state at a fixed price and only if it was rejected by the treasury did the 
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manufacturer have the right to sell it freely. Careless and unlucky entrepreneurs could have their 
factories removed and transferred to full ownership of the state.35 It is natural that a bourgeois 
system was not able to develop normally in conditions of politarian society—in Russia there 
were no guarantees of private-personal property or independent judiciary, and entrepreneurs 
experienced constant pressure by the state bureaucracy, total corruption ruled in a country, and 
so on (all this is quite characteristic also for modern Russia). 
 Therefore, in spite of an initial impetus given to the economy and society by the Petrine 
reforms, the Russian empire over the course of time yielded more and more to the most 
developed and dynamic capitalistic states, including even in the critically important military 
sphere, because of a gradually accumulating economic, technical, and technological lag. This 
was clearly demonstrated by the Crimean (Eastern) War of 1853–1856. It is under the influence 
of the defeat in this large-scale clash with the leading capitalistic powers of that time—England 
and France—that Emperor Alexander II began his Great Reforms, which were designed to bring 
Russia onto the track of capitalistic development, of course, with the assistance and under the 
control of the state. In 1861, by royal manifest, serfdom was finally repealed, but peasant 
communities did not receive land in their full ownership and for decades were obliged to pay so-
called “redemption payments” to former landlords and the state.36 The government, striving to 
create a modern military-industrial complex and infrastructure, willingly subsidized and 
encouraged accelerated construction of the railroad, and then industrialization of the country, 
actively attracting foreign capital.37 As a result, at the beginning of the twentieth century in 
Russia, a quite specific variant of state monopolistic capitalism formed, for which a very high 
concentration and centralization of capital was characteristic, as well as the domination of 
monopolies connected with the treasury.38 The consequence was a lack of initiative and passivity 
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of a significant part of the Russian bourgeoisie, its orientation toward “extorting” money from 
the state treasury, and receipt of various benefits from the government bureaucracy—an 
occurrence quite close to modern Russian reality. 
 The merging of domestic capital with the state increased during World War I, which 
began in August 1914, when government contracts and state regulation of the economy reached 
its apogee. In the agrarian sector, attempts, by means of the Stolypin Reforms after the revolution 
of 1905, to put the rural economy on the track of capitalism through dismantling the community 
and communal land ownership and the development of individual farming, on the whole, was not 
successful. Most of the peasants continued to work within the framework of traditional rural 
communities, with their regular equalizing redistribution of the land. At the same time, rapid 
demographic growth in the village naturally led to the dispossession of the peasantry and growth 
of social tension. It was increased by the struggle between the urban proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie, the social, ethnic, and religious discrimination that existed in Russia, and discontent 
of part of the ruling elite with the existing system. 
 The sharpest contradictions that formed in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth 
century were not settled by the revolution of 1905 nor by the February Revolution of 1917, 
though both events, each in their own way, contributed to the affirmation and development of 
capitalist relations and bourgeois democracy. The first led to the appearance of a Russian 
parliament—the Duma, and the second—to the fall of the Romanov dynasty and establishment 
of a republic. The final formation of a bourgeois society in Russia was hindered by the October 
Revolution of 1917, which is usually treated in the historiography as a “socialist revolution” 
carried out by the Bolsheviks led by V. I. Lenin. However, it could be argued that the events of 
October 1917 were not a socialist revolution but a politarian counterrevolution, which pushed 
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Russia from the course of bourgeois development to traditional politarism, but in new “socialist 
packaging.”39 Indeed, the Bolsheviks, arriving in power in the fall of 1917, in just one year 
nationalized and “collectivized” all the primary means of production (including land), having 
placed them under the control of the state (the party-state apparatus), that is, in fact revived the 
economic base of politarism. Moreover, the basic plan was laid out by Lenin as early as the 
summer of 1917 in the work program “State and Revolution.” In it he wrote about the need for 
the existence of a state with the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” for the normal functioning of 
“socialism”:  
 “Accounting and control—that is the main thing needed for ‘smooth running,’  
 for correct functioning of the first phase of Communist society. All the citizens  
 are here turned into hired employees of the state, which are armed workers.  
 All citizens become employees and workers of one nationwide, state ‘syndicate.’  
 The fact is that they all work equally, do their proper share of work, and receive 
 equally. . . . All society will be one office and one factory with equality of work and 
 equality of pay.”40 
 
 Of course, in his theoretical calculations the chief of the “proletariat revolution” forgot to 
mention that since the primary means of production will be in the hand of the state, and not the 
workers (who will be forced to go to it as hired workers), this will mean inevitable preservation 
of exploitation, which is incompatible with the very concept of “socialism.” 
 Attempts by the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution of 1917 to bring to life the 
Lenin plan in the form of politics of “military Communism” (in fact: politarism) led to the most 
severe economic crisis, with peasant uprisings and hunger in the Volga region in 1921–1922. 
After the uprising of armed seamen in Kronshtadt in March 1921, Lenin was forced to depart 
from his initial plans for the construction of “socialism” and form a New Economic Policy 
(NEP). Justifying this step, he wrote in October 1921:  
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 “We calculated—or perhaps it is better to say: we assumed without sufficient 
 calculation—to establish, by the direct dictates of a proletarian state, state  
 production and state distribution of goods in the Communist way in a   
 small-peasant country. Life revealed our error. Several transitional steps were 
 required: state capitalism and socialism, in order to prepare—work for several  
 long years to prepare—the transition to Communism.”41 
  
 Lenin through no accident designated the transition period as “state capitalism,” since the 
state continued to preserve the commanding heights in the economy and other spheres of life of 
Soviet society. Of course, Soviet authority during the period of the NEP permitted market trade-
money relations, small and medium capitalistic entrepreneurship, admission of foreign capital 
into the country on a limited scale, but this was only temporary and a necessary measure for 
restoring the economy of the country ruined by the Civil War. When this problem was solved, 
the apex of the Bolshevik party made a bid for establishing a planned economy and took a course 
toward industrialization in order to create in first order a powerful military-industrial complex in 
the second half of the 1920s–1930s, which in its turn required concentration of all material, 
financial, and human resources in the hands of the state.42 Therefore, at the end of the 1920s the 
NEP was liquidated by the efforts of Comrade Stalin (“Lenin’s faithful disciple,”) by whom all 
the economic structures were liquidated except the state and the formally independent kolkhoz 
sector. On the base of the strengthening of politarism, the Soviet totalitarian regime and the cult 
of personality of the Soviet chief blossomed in full. At the same time, creation by the state due to 
unbridled exploitation (including slave labor of prisoners in the “Gulag archipelago”) of 
powerful Soviet industry permitted the USSR to win the most difficult war with Germany and its 
satellites, and then to create an atomic bomb, and become the first country to launch Sputnik and 
a man into space in the second half of the 1950s–beginning of the 1960s.43 
11
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 Nevertheless, with time the Soviet politarian system began to show signs of decline. 
After the death of the “father of all times and peoples” in 1953 and the rejection by the state of 
the most odious forms of exploitation and forced labor (in the system of Gulag and kolkhozes), 
the politarian system of the USSR gradually deteriorated, not able to provide a labor capacity and 
quality of basic forms of production higher than in Western countries (with the exception of the 
production of military and space branches, for which the state did not spare any means). 
Attempts by N. S. Khrushchëv and M. S. Gorbachëv to reform Soviet politarism at the beginning 
of the 1960s and second half of the 1980s ended unsuccessfully: in the first case everything 
ended with a return to the old ways, and in the second, the Gorbachëv Perestroika ended with 
complete collapse of the system of “developed socialism,” clearly not without external factors 
and the influence of an internal “fifth column.”44 
 The independent Russia that emerged at the end of 1991 on the ruins of the USSR tried 
again, as at the beginning of the century, to construct capitalism and democracy. However, on 
this route it suffered a setback. An orgy of “wild” capitalism began in the country, analogous to 
the western variant in the period of “initial accumulation of capital,” though with a notable 
politarian Soviet legacy. As a result of the reformation of the economy in accordance with the 
prescripts of the first Russian president’s (B. N. Yeltsin’s) economic councilors—E. T. Gaidar, 
A. B. Chubais, and other homegrown liberals and their western “friends,” led by the International 
Monetary Fund—privatized state property has fallen primarily in the hands of the former 
representatives of the party-state apparatus, criminal organizations, and foreign companies. The 
last were not at all interested in preserving the powerful industrial potential that Russia attained 
as the legacy from the USSR, and the first strove to enrich themselves at any cost and in the 
briefest period, as a result of which colossal damage was done to the economy of the country, 
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and the primary bulk of the people were set at the brink of poverty. The drop in production in the 
1990s in Russia exceeded analogous figures for WWII. A wave of deindustrialization passed 
over the country, with a drop exceeding 70 percent in key branches of industry.45 From a rather 
well-developed industrial power, in just a decade Russia in fact turned into a raw-resources semi-
colony of Western countries and China, where representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie in 
the sphere of energy (oil and gas) and primary industries (aluminum, titanium, platinum, coal, 
timber, and so on) have become the key economic players under the auspices or with direct 
participation of the state bureaucracy. Since primary means of production have concentrated in 
the oligarchy or continued to remain with the state, this meant the lack in the country of a large 
middle class (the layer of small and medium owners)—the support of any democratic regime. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that it was not able to take root in post-Soviet Russia: here it 
simply lacked the adequate socioeconomic base. A natural event in this regard was tanks 
shooting at the Russian parliament—the Duma—in October 1993 by order of President B. N. 
Yeltsin, who actually carried out an anti-state coup.46 Soon adopted, the new Russian 
Constitution secured for the president of the country almost unlimited authority, though formally 
it emphasized its democratic principles. The way out of this ideological conflict was declaration 
by Kremlin political strategists of the concept of “managed democracy” in Russia—in essence a 
fig leaf for an actual existing authoritarian regime. 
 The regime that was formed in Russia in the mid-1990s is hard to call anything other than 
a “criminal oligarchy and monopolistic bureaucracy.” Its evolution followed the way of 
imminent degradation, which ended in default in 1998 and the complete discrediting of the 
supreme authority in the person of President E. B. Yeltsin. V. V. Putin, who replaced him at this 
post in 2000, followed the proven route of strengthening the role of the state and bureaucracy in 
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the economy, in fact having created a hybrid politarian-capitalistic system.47 Contributing to this 
in no small degree was the 2007 creation of monopolistic state corporations and an increase in 
state control and regulation. If in 2000, 80 percent of the gross domestic product of Russia was 
produced by 1,200 companies, in 2007 it was a total of only 500 companies.48 These processes 
were only increased under the influence of the global economic crisis of 2008, when the state 
began to save primarily big business and banks by means of generous financial injections, 
throwing small and medium enterprises at the mercy of fate. An additional painful ordeal for 
them was an increase in the tax burden in the first half of the 2010s and impossibly high lending 
rates, which reached more than 20 percent after the ruble’s drop in rate of exchange during the 
second half of 2014–beginning of 2015. 
 While medium and small business with great difficulty barely made ends meet, large 
monopolies (private, state, and mixed) flourish in the country in spite of all the formal 
declarations of the authorities about the struggle with monopolies and with cartel collusions of 
the leading companies and trade nets. Where monopolies and their merging with the state 
organizations can lead, especially under conditions of economic crisis, is well known from 
Russian and global history (think Germany of 1933). Moreover, the crisis processes in the 
Russian economy, generated by different factors including prohibitive monopolization, 
intensified even more in 2014 after the annexation of the Crimea to Russia and the introduction 
of economic and political sanctions by Western countries and Japan. This only increased the 
gravitation of the Russian economy and society toward politics of autarchy, strengthened the 
army and military-industrial complex in an atmosphere of promotion of the idea of a “besieged 
fort” before the person of the hostile position of the West and glorification of the patriotic service 
to the state. 
14
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 These factors, multiplied by age-old historical traditions and the logic of development of 
the Russian economy over the last twenty years have been objectively pushing Russia toward 
complete restoration of politarism. It can most probably occur in the form of a model reminiscent 
of the “corporate state” of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, but without support on narrow 
nationalism (it is less probable under conditions of multinational Russia). The reality of such a 
scenario is attested by state monopolization or monopolization by organizations of mass media 
controlled by it, strengthening of state propaganda and censorship, repression of political 
opponents, formation of the cult of personality for V. V. Putin,49 and the like.50 The nearest 
future will show whether this scenario is fully or partially realized. 
 In sum, the following pattern of Russian history can be shown: In the face of severe 
nature, natural and social disasters, external pressure, military and economic failures, blunders by 
the head of state, the Russian society, being a complex self-organizing system, each time chooses 
a politarian system as the only form of life suitable for survival in extreme conditions. The 
Russian elite also prefers politarism as the simplest and most effective way to manage and draw 
surplus goods from the people. Therefore, in spite of every external or internal crisis, the 
politarian system of Russia sooner or later is created anew and the state again takes all spheres of 
the life of society in its hands, imposing and dictating its will. It is this process occurring now, 
marking the emergence of the Russian “Leviathan” in its next incarnation. 
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